A SMART Approach to First Amendment Line Drawing? Free Speech Restrictions in Nonpublic Forums by MacDonald, Taylor G.
2021] OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE 1 
A SMART Approach to First Amendment Line 
Drawing? 




I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 1 
II. SMART 2012 DECISION AND REVERSAL .......................................... 2 
III. ALIGNING SMART WITH DIFFERENT THEORIES OF FREE SPEECH .. 6 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the deceptively absolutist language of the First Amendment, the 
Court has struggled with inevitable line-drawing problems. The Free Speech 
Clause primarily restricts the government from regulating speech in public 
places––traditionally spaces open to public debate1––but grants it more leeway 
in nonpublic forums.2 In American Freedom Defense Initiative v. Suburban 
Mobility Authority (hereinafter “SMART 2020”), the Sixth Circuit ruled that 
Michigan’s Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation 
(SMART) violated the First Amendment by adhering to guidelines restricting 
buses from allowing ads that were “political” or promoted “scorn or ridicule.”3 
SMART 2020 underlines the disjointedness of First Amendment jurisprudence 
and compels us to develop a more unified theory of the First Amendment.  
The SMART 2020 decision involves two First Amendment questions: 
whether public transit bus advertising space qualifies as a public or nonpublic 
forum; and whether SMART’s ban on ads that are “political” or hold a certain 
group up to “scorn or ridicule” is permissible. Earlier in the SMART case 
(hereinafter “SMART 2012”), the Sixth Circuit found the advertising space on 
SMART’s buses constituted a nonpublic forum and the restrictions on 
advertising were likely reasonable and viewpoint neutral.4 Two recent Supreme 
Court cases have provided additional guidance on free speech restrictions in 
nonpublic forums. In Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky (2018), the Court ruled that 
speech restrictions in nonpublic forums must be reasonable and viewpoint 
 
  Taylor G. MacDonald is a J.D. candidate at The Ohio State University Moritz 
College of Law and writes for THE OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL Sixth Circuit Review.  
 1 Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939); Schneider v. State of 
New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162.  
 2 Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); 
Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 
789 (1984).  
 3 American Freedom Def. Initiative v. Suburban Mobility Auth., No. 19-311, slip op. 
at 11–19 (6th Cir. Oct. 23, 2020).  
 4 American Freedom Def. Initiative v. Suburban Mobility Auth., 698 F.3d 885, 890–
96 (6th Cir. 2012), rev’d, No. 19-311 (6th Cir. Oct. 23, 2020).  
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neutral.5 In Matal v. Tam (2017), it held that a standard is not viewpoint neutral 
if it allows positive depictions of a topic but bans negative depictions.6 The 
Mansky and Matal decisions compelled the Sixth Circuit to reverse its earlier 
ruling rejecting the First Amendment challenge to the SMART restrictions.7 
SMART 2020 provides broader protection for free speech in nonpublic 
forums by clarifying the requirements for reasonableness and viewpoint 
neutrality. But it also raises the question of how to distinguish protected and 
unprotected speech. Because judicial doctrine does not offer a satisfactory 
answer, we must devise a unified First Amendment theory that reflects 
constitutional ideals and outlines an analytical framework for line-drawing 
problems. A strong approach to defining First Amendment theory involves 
balancing individual rights with social benefits.8 The First Amendment will not 
draw a line in the sand for us; ultimately we must develop a theory of free speech 
that does not subordinate social benefits to absolutist individual rights.  
II. SMART 2012 DECISION AND REVERSAL 
The American Freedom Defense Initiative (AFDI) brought suit against 
SMART in 2010, claiming SMART had violated the First Amendment by 
refusing to display an ad in violation of its advertising guidelines.9 The ad read: 
“Fatwa on your head? Is your family or community threatening you? Leaving 
Islam? Got questions? Get answers!”10 It also included a link to 
RefugeFromIslam.com.11 SMART claimed the ad was political because the 
word “fatwa” evoked sharia law and the linked website contained anti-Islamic 
commentary.12 It also worried that the ad would hold people of the Islamic faith 
up to “scorn and ridicule” by implying they might threaten family members who 
tried to leave the religion.13  
The Court first questioned whether advertising space on public buses is a 
public or a nonpublic forum, which determines what level of scrutiny to apply. 
The government may not regulate the content of speech in designated public 
forums unless it can satisfy strict scrutiny.14 In nonpublic forums, it must only 
show that any restrictions are reasonable15 and viewpoint neutral.16 In SMART 
2012, the Sixth Circuit found the advertising space on SMART’s city buses was 
 
 5 Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1885 (2018).  
 6 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1766 (2017) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment).  
 7 Suburban Mobility 2020, supra note 3, at 2–3.  
 8 Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1015, 1018. 
 9 Suburban Mobility 2012, supra note 4, at 888.  
 10 Id. at 888.  
 11 Id.  
 12 Id. at 894.  
 13 Id. at 889.  
 14 Mansky, supra note 5, at 1885. 
 15 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788,  807–08 (1985). 
 16 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–30 (1995).  
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a nonpublic forum because its policy and practice demonstrated intent to create 
such a forum and its restrictions were intended to raise revenue.17 In 2020, the 
Sixth Circuit “lean[ed] toward viewing SMART’s advertising space as a 
nonpublic forum,” notably because “SMART’s formal policies bar political and 
political-campaign ads, a limit incompatible with an intent to create a public 
forum.”18 The Court discussed factors indicating whether the advertising space 
was a public or a nonpublic forum, but it ultimately declined to resolve the 
question19 because SMART’s advertising guidelines failed even the more 
forgiving nonpublic forum review.20  
The 2020 Court changed course on the reasonableness and viewpoint-
neutrality standards.21 In 2012, the Sixth Circuit found SMART’s advertising 
guidelines reasonable because SMART needed to restrict political ads to 
increase ad revenue and avoid offending a captive audience.22 Moreover, it held 
that the determination of what constitutes “political” content was a “reasonably 
objective exercise.”23 The 2020 Court disagreed on both counts. Relying on 
Mansky and Matal, the Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that SMART’s ban 
on “political” ads is not reasonable and its ban on ads engaging in “scorn or 
ridicule” is not viewpoint neutral.  
A free speech restriction in a nonpublic forum is reasonable if “the proposed 
conduct would ‘actually interfere’ with the forum’s stated purpose,”24 and a 
forum may ban political advertisements if the restriction aims to limit 
controversial content to increase revenue.25 A rule must be clear enough that “a 
person of ordinary intelligence [could] readily identify the applicable standard 
for inclusion and exclusion.”26 Although a restriction cannot leave the line-
drawing exercise to the unchecked discretion of a government official, it may 
involve some exercise of discretion. 27 In SMART 2012, the Sixth Circuit held 
the restriction on political ads in SMART’s advertising guidelines was 
 
 17 Suburban Mobility 2012, supra note 4, at 890–92. 
 18 Suburban Mobility 2020, supra note 3, at 12.  
 19 Because SMART’s guidelines failed even the most forgiving standard, the Sixth 
Circuit declined to specify what type of forum SMART created with its advertising space. 
The Supreme Court, however, offered guidance on the issue when it noted that the 
advertising space on a bus, unlike the license plate of a car, is a context “traditionally 
available for private speech.” Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 576 U.S. 
200, 218 (2015) (citing Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 94 (1974)). 
 20 Suburban Mobility 2020, supra note 5, at 12–13.  
 21 Id. at 2–3.   
 22 Suburban Mobility 2012, supra note 6, at 892.  
 23 Id. at 894.  
 24 United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Southwest Ohio Reg’l Transit Auth., 
163 F.3d 341, 358 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. Dep’t of Aviation, 45 
F.3d 1144, 1159 (7th Cir. 1995)).  
 25 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974). 
 26 United Food, supra note 28, at 358–59.  
 27 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150–51 (1969). 
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reasonable because it provided guidance for distinguishing permissible and 
impermissible ads and required a minimal exercise of discretion.28  
The Supreme Court’s clarification of the reasonableness standard compelled 
the Sixth Circuit to reconsider. Mansky addressed a Minnesota law that banned 
voters from wearing “political” apparel at polling places, which are nonpublic 
forums.29 The Court approved of the law’s goal of keeping partisan discord out 
of polling locations.30 At issue was the lack of a clear definition of the word 
“political,” which effectively banned apparel mentioning groups with political 
views or issues on which a political candidate had taken a stance.31 This 
ambiguous definition had confusing implications; a shirt with the text of the 
Second Amendment would be banned for “political” content because it invoked 
the divisive issue of gun rights, but a shirt with the text of the First Amendment 
would be acceptable.32 Yet surely the First Amendment is firmly enshrined in 
the realm of politics. The Court concluded the “political” ban could not be 
applied objectively and states “must employ a more discernible approach.”33  
On reconsideration, the Sixth Circuit finds that SMART’s similarly opaque 
definition of “political” ads is impermissible. Like the Supreme Court in 
Mansky, the Sixth Circuit had no qualms with the goals of SMART’s advertising 
restrictions, but took issue with the “unmoored use of the term ‘political’”34 
resulting in “an amorphous ban on political speech that cannot be objectively 
applied.”35 SMART’s ban led to inconsistent results. SMART rejected the 
“fatwa” ad for its anti-Islamic sentiment, just as it once rejected a pro-life ad 
that listed websites discouraging abortion.36 But SMART accepted an atheist ad 
promoting separation of church and state, which SMART conceded was a 
political topic.37 The Sixth Circuit rejected SMART’s “made-for-litigation” 
definition of “political”––“any advocacy of a position of any politicized issue”–
–as vague, unworkable, and susceptible to the same “haphazard interpretation” 
that Mansky found unacceptable.38 SMART failed to articulate a “more 
discernible approach” to defining political speech, and the ban was 
constitutionally invalid.39  
Even a reasonable restriction on free speech cannot prohibit certain 
viewpoints on topics it allows.40 In SMART 2012, AFDI argued that SMART’s 
 
 28 Suburban Mobility 2012, supra note 6, at 892–894.  
 29 Mansky, supra note 7, at 1885–88.  
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 1888–91. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Mansky, supra note 7, at 1888. 
 35 Suburban Mobility 2020, supra note 5, at 494–98. 
 36 Id. at 495.  
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. (quoting Mansky, supra note 7, at 1888).  
 39 Id. at 497. 
 40 Rosenberger, supra note 19, at 829–30. 
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“scorn or ridicule” ban was impermissible because it forbade anti-Islamic ads 
but would permit a pro-Islamic (or neutral) ad.41 The Sixth Circuit disagreed, 
claiming that the banned content was the debate about sharia law in the United 
States, not Islam itself, and either side would be impermissibly political.42 
Because the Court saw the restriction as reasonable and viewpoint neutral, the 
ban was permissible. 
Matal indicates that the Sixth Circuit was wrong to treat SMART’s “scorn 
or ridicule” ban as viewpoint neutral. The Supreme Court is skeptical vis-à-vis 
viewpoint discrimination, which it describes as an “egregious form of content 
discrimination,”43 because it suggests “official suppression of ideas” by the 
government.44 Such suppression is precisely the evil the First Amendment 
addresses: “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is 
that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because 
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” 45 The Supreme Court 
recognizes that because many issues beget a multitude of viewpoints, it is 
important to define viewpoint discrimination broadly.46 
Matal concerned an Asian-American rock group called “The Slants” that 
chose its name to reclaim the derogatory term.47 When the band tried to 
trademark its name, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) denied the 
application as a violation of a Lanham Act provision barring federal trademark 
registration for marks that would disparage “any persons, living or dead.”48 
While the ban could “evenhandedly prohibit disparagement of all groups,” the 
Court concluded that it discriminated on the basis of viewpoint.49  
Like the anti-disparagement provision in Matal, the “scorn or ridicule” ban 
in SMART’s advertising guidelines is a violation of the First Amendment.50 
Both restrictions discriminate based on viewpoint by facially discriminating 
between ideas that promote a group or topic and ideas that disparage it.51 The 
Ninth Circuit adopted the same approach in 2018 when it ruled that a public 
transit agency violated an anti-Muslim group’s First Amendment rights by 
refusing to run bus ads featuring names and headshots of sixteen purported 
terrorists.52 Matal was also the crucial point of analysis for the Ninth Circuit, 
 
 41 Suburban Mobility 2012, supra note 6, at 894. 
 42 Id. at 895. 
 43 Rosenberger, supra note 19, at 829–30. 
 44 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992). 
 45 Suburban Mobility 2020, supra note 5, at 498–99 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 
U.S. 397 (1989)).  
 46 See Rosenberger, supra note 16, at 830–31; R.A.V., supra note 44, at 388; Matal, 
supra note 6, at 1763.  
 47 Matal, supra note 6, at 1747.  
 48 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §1052(a)).  
 49 Id. at 1763. 
 50 Suburban Mobility 2020, supra note 3, at 500. 
 51 Id.  
 52 American Freedom Def. Initiative v. King County, 904 F.3d 1126, 1130–33 (9th Cir. 
2018). 
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which ruled that the transit agency’s restriction on ads that demean or disparage 
was viewpoint discrimination.53 
SMART 2020 underlines the importance of the clarifications on free speech 
restrictions laid out in Mansky and Matal. The Supreme Court’s staunch 
protection of free speech tracks with the First Amendment’s literal and 
figurative primacy in American governance and culture. Americans love 
freedom of speech, even when we do not fully understand its complex legal 
implications. “We are eager to rest on free speech claims and, where they do not 
exist, to make them. With a reliability approaching that of the laws of physics, 
we may set it down that whenever the First Amendment can be invoked, it will 
be invoked.”54 This knee-jerk invocation of freedom of speech underscores the 
importance of drawing a clear line between protected and unprotected speech.  
III. ALIGNING SMART WITH DIFFERENT THEORIES OF FREE SPEECH 
Freedom of speech is inherently a line-drawing exercise. Although the First 
Amendment lays out freedom of speech in absolute terms, the Supreme Court 
has explicitly rejected an absolutist view of the First Amendment.55 Virtually 
all Supreme Court Justices take the view that there are some restrictions to free 
speech,56 such as perjury laws, obscenity laws, and shouting fire in a crowded 
theater.57 Because freedom of speech is not an absolute, First Amendment 
philosophy must guide courts in their determination of what speech is protected. 
No single philosophy encompasses the full scope of the First Amendment––and 
no philosophy is without its critics. Four philosophies outline the goals of the 
First Amendment: promoting self-governance, discovering truth, allowing self-
expression, and encouraging tolerance.58  
Americans guard the right to free speech jealously even when it fails to 
support any of these goals, leaving its purpose unclear. Beyond the goal of 
allowing free government criticism, even the framers’ intent is uncertain.59 First 
Amendment judicial opinions never seem to cohere to a unified purpose because 
the purpose is either unarticulated, contradicted, or morally dubious. A synthetic 
 
 53 Id.  
 54 Leslie Kendrick, How Much Does Speech Matter?, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 997, 997 
(2016) (reviewing SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY, 
AND THE LAW (2014)).  
 55 Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961). 
 56 Justice Hugo Black took an absolutist approach to the First Amendment in 1960, 
when he wrote: “The phrase ‘Congress shall make no law’ is composed of plain words, easily 
understood. The language is absolute. . . . [T]he Framers themselves did this balancing when 
they wrote the [First Amendment]. . . . Courts have neither the right nor the power to make 
a different judgment.” Hugo Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 865, 879 (1960). 
Justice William O. Douglas sometimes joined his colleague in this absolutist approach. 
Konigsberg, supra note 63, at 56 (Black, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, J.).  
 57 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).  
 58 See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 59 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 1–18. (1994).  
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theory of free speech based on individual rights would preserve the First 
Amendment’s goals and avoid complicating an already disjointed patchwork of 
jurisprudence. SMART 2020 illustrates this point; the ad at issue offers no 
legitimate government criticism, no ideas bending toward truth. The autonomy 
it advances comes at the expense of others’ sense of safety, and if it seeks to 
promote tolerance, it has yet to fulfill that promise.  
Freedom of speech arose to promote open discussion of politics and allow 
citizens to voice their concerns, hold public officials accountable, make 
informed political decisions, and criticize the government.60 Though the 
Supreme Court has never said the First Amendment only protects political 
speech,61 it has stated that the ability to criticize the government is “the central 
meaning of the First Amendment.”62 Both in its history and its judicial 
interpretation, the First Amendment protects the right to political speech: the 
right to speak freely about the government. Based on this understanding of the 
term “political,” SMART’s rejected fatwa ad is not political speech, because 
surely a criticism of sharia law is not a criticism of the United States 
government, which is decidedly not an Islamic institution. The speech in the ad 
is constitutionally protected, but it clearly does not serve the goal of educating 
the public about political choices or criticizing the United States government. 
Nor is it wise to publish loaded religious rhetoric on a public transit bus, where 
any layperson might understand that speech to be sponsored or at least tolerated 
by the government––for the latter, they would be correct.  
But “the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.”63 Truth does not 
tend to spring from a pure source, but rather to distill over time from a clash of 
contradictory ideas. The marketplace of ideas approach is based on this logic: 
“the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their 
wishes safely can be carried out.”64 The battle between evil ideas and truth is 
often lengthy and can cause irrevocable harm. “In the long run, true ideas do 
tend to drive out false ones. The problem is that the short run may be very long, 
that one short run follows hard upon another, and that we may become 
overwhelmed by the inexhaustible supply of freshly minted, often very 
seductive, false ideas.”65 The alternative to free speech requires government 
intervention, which many argue would quickly lead to abuse of that authority.66 
We must draw the line between these extremes.  
Although the “scorn and ridicule” ban is unconstitutional, it had a worthy 
goal: preventing its ads from causing suffering to individuals or groups. Anti-
 
 60 See ZECHARIAH CHAFFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (1941). 
 61 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967).  
 62 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964).  
 63 Whitney, supra note 66, at 375.  
 64 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
 65 Harry Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 Yale. L.J. 1105, 1130–32 (1979).  
 66 See MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREE SPEECH 1–12 (1984).  
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Islamic sentiment and violence is strong in America,67 and if the fatwa ad does 
not directly incite violence, it does nothing to mitigate that danger. Publishing a 
pro-Islamic ad in retaliation would likely inflame existing tensions, not promote 
heathy debate. Germany bans displays of Nazi symbols, and the legality of that 
practice in the United States does little to serve our democratic ideals. Because 
there is no central, unifying theory for the First Amendment, we must impose 
our own purpose and philosophy.  
Some First Amendment scholars argue that freedom of speech is crucial to 
individual autonomy68 and “a spirit that demands self-expression.”69 Yet we 
limit self-expression when it threatens the autonomy of others, as with obscenity 
laws, and many have used similar logic to argue that pornography and hate 
speech should not receive First Amendment protection.70 The same rationale 
might apply to rhetoric, like the fatwa ad, that targets a particular group.  
The final argument for free speech is that it promotes tolerance by exposing 
individuals to ideas that they might not otherwise encounter.71 First Amendment 
doctrine here encounters the tolerance paradox, which asserts that unlimited 
tolerance leads to the disappearance of tolerance. “[I]f we are not prepared to 
defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant 
will be destroyed, and tolerance with them. . . . We should therefore claim, in 
the name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant.”72 Tolerance is a 
noble goal, but it, like free speech, must have limits to be meaningful.  
Free speech must legitimize government by furthering individual interests, 
rather than protecting one at the expense of the other.73 SMART 2020 is a correct 
interpretation of the law with a morally dubious result: hateful religious rhetoric 
forced upon unsuspecting commuters on public transit. There is a disconnect 
between our laws and our morals, our reflexive protection of free speech with 
little regard to social consequences. SMART 2020 is morally shocking because 
 
 67 Shortly before the 2016 presidential election, the New York Times reported that hate 
crimes against American Muslims (and those perceived as Muslims because of their skin 
tone or style of dress) were at their highest levels since the aftermath of the 2001 terror 
attacks. According to numerous experts in hate crimes and some of the attackers themselves, 
anti-Islamic rhetoric from then-candidate Donald Trump was an important motivating force 
for these attacks. Eric Lichtblau, Hate Crimes Against American Muslims Most Since Post-
9/11 Era, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/18/us/politics/hate-crimes-american-muslims-rise.html.  
 68 See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA 
L. Rev. 964, 994 (1978).  
 69 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring).  
 70 CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 146–213 (1987); Richard 
Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 
17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 133 (1982).  
 71 Tolerance theory dates back to 1859, when British philosopher John Stuart Mill 
wrote that individual freedom needed protection from government tyranny, censorship, and 
paternalism. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859). 
 72 KARL POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 581 (1945).  
 73 Free Speech Constitutionalism, supra note 8, at 1043.  
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an anti-Islamic ad in modern-day America is far more likely to sow hatred and 
prejudice than to spark honest and productive debate. The law should explicitly 
balance the value of individual speech against its likely social consequences. 
Anti-Islamic speech is not self-expression, but an attack on others’ self-
expression that directly limits that right. The Court protects this speech even 
though it does little to advance any First Amendment goals. A strict reading of 
the First Amendment does not serve democratic goals or help create a freer 
country. It restricts freedom by allowing evil counsels free reign to bulldoze 
individuals’ right to safety.  
Free speech in America is expansive, sprawling; Americans are proud of 
this fact. The idea of free speech restrictions is anathema to many Americans 
because First Amendment rights have come to represent freedom writ large. “It 
can seem as though there’s no principled way out of this conundrum: if you 
equate democracy with the proliferation of free speech, then how can you, in 
good conscience, restrict it?”74 But in the wake of the 2020 election, with its 
pervasive “fake news” and interminable (but necessary) fact-checking, 
Americans are coming around to the idea of imposing restrictions on free 
speech.75 The law must reflect, embody, and respond to Americans’ changing 
values and concerns, including those regarding the lofty ideal of free speech. 




 74 Astra Taylor, The Future of Democracy: The Right to Listen, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 
27, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-future-of-democracy/the-right-to-listen.  
 75 Joshua Eferighe, Why Americans Are Rethinking Free Speech, OZY (Nov. 2, 2020), 
https://www.ozy.com/news-and-politics/why-americans-are-rethinking-free-
speech/396971/.  
